Michèle Valerie Cloonan, W(H)ITHER Preservation? The Library Quarterly, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 231-242.
Salvador Muñoz-Viñas, Contemporary Theory of Conservation, (2005) Burlington: Elsevier.
The Notion of Authenticity
Establishing a "philosophy" for the preservation of cultural heritage is a complex undertaking. It requires contemplating why cultures manifest an impulse to preserve, and how. Motivation for preserving documents and monuments range from sentimental nostalgia to nationalist fervor. Where does the preservation professional find his/her place along such a continuum? Although there are rich treatments of the preservation of cultural memory in literature from such disciplines as anthropology, archaeology, history, museology, and sociology, discussions specific to library and archival literature have been relatively quiet. Cloonan and Muñoz-Viñas have done much to shape this discourse by exploring themes relevant to preservation professionals.
Recent developments in the field of digital preservation have prompted new examinations of the notion of authenticity for physical objects. When restoration was the prevailing method for intervening with historical objects, concern for the integrity of the object's physical appearance largely dictated its treatment. In other words, attempts were undertaken to restore the object to the condition of its creation. The original condition was considered to be its most "authentic" state, and therefore returning the artifact to that state was desirable.
Crafting a philosophy of preservation begs unraveling the intertwined meanings of originality and authenticity. As Cloonan suggests, "the paradox of preservation is that it is impossible to keep things the same forever. To conserve, preserve, restore is to alter" (235). Muñoz-Viñas prods the question further. Taking issue with the notion authenticity commonly espoused by what he calls "Classical" conservation/preservation philosophies, that objects can have a "true" nature, he points out that the underlying logic of this reasoning is deeply flawed: "Objects cannot exist in a state of falsehood, nor can they have a false nature. If they really exist, they are inherently real. The expected, imagined or preferred is not real unless it coincides with the existing object" (93, emphasis in original). What, on the surface appears to be merely a semantic problem extends much deeper to the core assumptions motivating preservation activities.
Historian David Lowenthal reminds us that "nothing ever made has been left untouched, nothing ever known remains immutable; yet these facts should not distress but emancipate us. It is far better to realize that the past has always been altered than to pretend it has always been the same. Advocates of preservation who adjure us to save things unchanged fight a losing battle, since even to appreciate the past is to transform it. Every relic is a testament not only to its initiator but its inheritors, not only to the spirit of the past but to the perspectives of the present" (Lowenthal 1985, emphasis mine). Just as with Heisenberg's microscope, we cannot examine historical objects without somehow altering their essence, intangibly or otherwise.
I raise this issue not to excuse inaction or shoddy treatments, but instead to suggest an understanding of historical objects that acknowledges their engagement with the present. And although preservation is perhaps inherently anachronistic, it is helpful to recognize this fact, rather than operating on a series of faulty premises.
Recent developments in the field of digital preservation have prompted new examinations of the notion of authenticity for physical objects. When restoration was the prevailing method for intervening with historical objects, concern for the integrity of the object's physical appearance largely dictated its treatment. In other words, attempts were undertaken to restore the object to the condition of its creation. The original condition was considered to be its most "authentic" state, and therefore returning the artifact to that state was desirable.
Crafting a philosophy of preservation begs unraveling the intertwined meanings of originality and authenticity. As Cloonan suggests, "the paradox of preservation is that it is impossible to keep things the same forever. To conserve, preserve, restore is to alter" (235). Muñoz-Viñas prods the question further. Taking issue with the notion authenticity commonly espoused by what he calls "Classical" conservation/preservation philosophies, that objects can have a "true" nature, he points out that the underlying logic of this reasoning is deeply flawed: "Objects cannot exist in a state of falsehood, nor can they have a false nature. If they really exist, they are inherently real. The expected, imagined or preferred is not real unless it coincides with the existing object" (93, emphasis in original). What, on the surface appears to be merely a semantic problem extends much deeper to the core assumptions motivating preservation activities.
Historian David Lowenthal reminds us that "nothing ever made has been left untouched, nothing ever known remains immutable; yet these facts should not distress but emancipate us. It is far better to realize that the past has always been altered than to pretend it has always been the same. Advocates of preservation who adjure us to save things unchanged fight a losing battle, since even to appreciate the past is to transform it. Every relic is a testament not only to its initiator but its inheritors, not only to the spirit of the past but to the perspectives of the present" (Lowenthal 1985, emphasis mine). Just as with Heisenberg's microscope, we cannot examine historical objects without somehow altering their essence, intangibly or otherwise.
I raise this issue not to excuse inaction or shoddy treatments, but instead to suggest an understanding of historical objects that acknowledges their engagement with the present. And although preservation is perhaps inherently anachronistic, it is helpful to recognize this fact, rather than operating on a series of faulty premises.
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4 comments:
I was also intrigued by Cloonan's "paradox of preservation". However, I do not see the ideas of Muñoz-Viñas and Cloonan as conflicting. Yes, an object exists and can only exist at this present moment, in its current state. The world is how it is. As Muñoz-Viñasas writes, objects cannot have "false" natures. That doesn't mean that an object isn't changing or hasn't been altered (damaged by time or repaired by human intervention). An object's current state is the reality of that object, no matter its past or future forms.
I guess I should re-word it, I meant to proffer Munoz-Vinaz as in keeping with Cloonan. I think both undermine older attitudes toward preservation that privilege a sort of ideal state, and that are moreover not nearly self-conscious enough about the implications of modifying works in order to achieve the "authentic" condition.
As a book conservator, I find the idea that digital preservation efforts lead to expanded definitions of authenticity both comforting and invigorating. Without the narrow confines of an "ideal" state, we are free to treat an object in a way that takes into account the broad context of its creation and the complexities of both is present and future. This, of course, makes our jobs more challenging, but I hope that in the long run it leads to preservation programs that more successfully integrate the work being done with the full range of our physical and digital objects.
The second paragraph in the essay could eventually develop into an research paper in which there is a discussion about if and how physical and digital preservation techniques can inform each other.
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